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THE INVESTMENT OPPORTUNITY IN MASS
INCARCERATION: A BLACK (CORRECTIONS) OR BROWN
(IMMIGRATION) PLAY?
GEIZA VARGAS-VARGAS*
There's been 133 nations identified crossing that border. Not just
Mexicans, not just Hondurans, not just El Salvadorans, but 133
nations. Many of those are nations of interest, which means that
they either harbor, aid and abet, or are somehow connected to
terrorist activities . . . . And yet they continue to cross that border.
We've got prayer rugs that have been found down there, other
things that have been found down there-and yet they [the federal
government] continue to do nothing.
-Arizona State Senator Russell Pierce, primary sponsor of S.B. 1070,
and whose state senate seat was recalled in the November 2011
elections. 1
Asked if the private companies usually get to write model bills for
the legislators, [an ALEC insider] said, 'Yeah, that's the way it's
set up. It's a public-private partnership. We believe both sides,
businesses and lawmakers should be at the same table, together.'
* Assistant Professor of Law, The Charleston School of Law, Charleston,
South Carolina. B.A., Wellesley College. J.D., Boston College Law School. I am
grateful to conferences like LatCrit, which support alternative forms of scholarship
that contribute to knowledge base of injustice and facilitate change of such injustice.
1. Beau Hodai, Corporate Con Game: How the Private Prison Industry
Helped Shape Arizona's Anti-Immigrant Law, IN THESE TIMES (June 21, 2010),
http://www.inthesetimes.com/print/corporate congame. Arizona Governor Jan
Brewer signed S.B. 1070, also known as the Support Our Law Enforcement and
Safe Neighborhoods Act, into law in April 2010, and it became effective as of July
29, 2010. See S.B. 1070, 49th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2010). In the November
2011 elections, Senator Pearce's seat was recalled. See also Marc Lacey &
Katharine Q. Seelye, Recall Election Claims Arizona Anti-Immigration Champion,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 10, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/201 1/1 1/10/us/politics/russell
-pearce-arizonas-anti-immgration-champion-is-recalled.html?pagewanted=all.
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-From Laura Sullivan's National Public Radio report, Prison
Economics Help Drive Arizona Immigration Law.2
About seven years ago, the Western New England Law Review
published my article on what I deemed (and still deem) to be the long-
term joint venture between the United States government and private
prison corporations to incarcerate our population of black men. In my
article, White Investment in Black Bondage (WIBB),3 I examined the
disclosure documents of the largest publicly traded corporations, as
well as statistical reports by the Bureau of Prisons and Department of
Justice, to arrive at a very clear conclusion. The disclosure documents
of the private prison corporation, as well as the government's
historical statistics and future projections, together pointed to one
thing: there was an actual, concerted effort to incarcerate and make
profit from black bodies. There was no question in my mind that the
federal and state governments played a concrete role as the sole clients
of the private prison corporation.
In 2008, UCLA professor Alexander Volokh published an article
in the Stanford Law Review entitled, Privatization and the Law and
Economics of Political Advocacy.4 Volokh cited my article along with
others, which he called a "small sample of the literature," in
opposition to prison privatization.5 Professor Volokh evaluated a
narrow angle on the anti-prison privatization argument, and purported
to explain via economic methodology why prison firms do not (and
more importantly would not want to) advocate, or lobby, for stricter
incarceration laws. Volokh argued against the position that
privatization would result in an "increase in the size of the market," 6
2. Laura Sullivan, Prison Economics Help Drive Ariz. Immigration Law,
NAT'L PUB. RADIO (Oct. 28, 2010), http://www.npr.org/2010/10/28/1308337 4 1/
prison-economics-help-drive-ariz-immigration-law; Who Really Writes States'
Legislation?, NAT'L PUB. RADIO (July 21, 2011), http://www.npr.org/2011/07/21/
138537515/how-alec-shapes-state-politics-behind-the-scenes.
3. Geiza Vargas-Vargas, White Investment in Black Bondage, 27 W. NEW
ENGL. L. REV 41 (2005).
4. Alexander Volokh, Privatization and the Law and Economics of Political
Advocacy, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1197 (2008).
5. Id. at 1202 n.31 (citing various sources).
6. Id. at 1197. See generally id at 1207-16.
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or "distort" criminal law.' He argued that such a position carried no
weight primarily because notwithstanding privatization, the public
sector has always had agents, namely corrections officers' unions,
lobbying for pro-incarceration policy. Therefore, it would not be cost-
effective for private prisons to spend earnings to do the same, nor
were they doing the same.8 Volokh also concluded via economic
modeling that privatization did not create a more dynamic
incarceration market. Instead, Professor Volokh argued that a rather
an interesting phenomenon occurred: a decrease in lobbying activities.
Ultimately, however, his conclusion was that evidence showing that
the impact of the private prison firm on the criminal justice system
was "ambiguous" at best.9 Effectively, according to Volokh, there was
no "smoking gun" to show what prison activists and legal scholars
claimed. This smoking gun argument was very clever.
Notwithstanding the lack of transparency in lobbying activity, for
Volokh, if you cannot prove it, it does not exist.
The topic that I introduced as a law student and that Professor
Volokh wrote about three years ago is now known as "mass
incarceration." Several scholars are focused on this issue,10 and
Michelle Alexander's book, The New Jim Crow," legitimizes it. It is
real now, at least for legal scholars.12 And for the public, it is real
because of immigration "reform."
7. Id. at 1197-98, 1205.
8. Id. at 1197.
9. See id. at 1205; see also MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW:
MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS (2010).
10. I attended the panel entitled, "Reconceptualizing Wealth in the Evaluation
of Global and Domestic Critiques of Equality" with Colin Crawford, Andre Douglas
Pond Cummings, Atiba R. Ellis, and Andrea Freeman. I was unable to attend the
panel "Race, Gender, and Criminality," but most certainly mass incarceration was
addressed in that panel as well. I also attended a work-in-progress that discussed the
"kids for cash" case against Judge Mark Ciavarella, Jr., convicted of taking bribes
from prison builders, and the impact on mass incarceration on incarcerated youth. In
addition, throughout the weekend there was much discussion about The New Jim
Crow.
11. See ALEXANDER, supra note 9.
12. For more information regarding how issue has always been real for
scholars and activists, see Volokh, supra note 4, at 1202 n.30; Eric Schlosser, The
Prison-Industrial Complex, ATLANTIC MONTHLY (Dec. 1998),
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1 998/12/the-prison-industrial-
3
Vargas-Vargas: Investment Opportunity in Mass Incarceration: A Black (Correction
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2011
CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW
Prior to LatCrit XVI, I was not aware of The New Jim Crow, as
the years between WIBB and now were occupied with my legal work
on Wall Street-mergers and acquisitions and hybrid collateralized
debt obligations, credit default swaps, total return swaps, the
structuring of complex financial instruments, those things that brought
the house down in 2007. In my work as a lawyer for my firm's Wall
Street clients, there was little energy or time to contemplate the ills of
the world, as mine grew narrower and narrower, always focused on
the almighty billable hour. I never stopped thinking or feeling, and the
various panels at LatCrit inspired me to complete me thoughts on the
matter.13 For many reasons, including that (i) I am Latina and not a
black male, and (ii) I was a deal lawyer and not a criminal lawyer, I
will never be the authority on the issue. But, at one point in time (and
still), I was a little voice in the field of flowers. The purpose of this
article is to fill what I perceived to be a gap in the scholarly discussion
on mass incarceration. The end of this article considers why there was
a gap. I delve into a phenomenon that became even more obvious to
me: the black/Latino divide.
PRISON STOCK
Publicly traded corporations exist because there is demand for the
particular investment offered by that corporation. 14 In other words,
people buy and sell stock in corporations that build and operate
private prisons (and service every aspect of the prison system) because
people want to own that kind of stock. By people, I mean individuals
and institutions or funds. If such demand did not exist, there would be
complex/4669/; The Sentencing Project Home, SENT'G PROJECT,
www.sentencingproject.org (last visited Feb. 27, 2012). In terms of legal scholars, I
would argue the issue is now mainstream.
13. Shortly after Volokh's piece was accepted for publication, I began writing
a response, one that I never completed. I abandoned the project because I could not
find anything beyond common sense to counter his very clever and strategically
written position. At the time ALEC was indeed a very private organization. It was
only in 2011 that ALEC model legislation was leaked outside the organization
membership. See John Nichols, ALEC Exposed, THE NATION (July 12, 2011),
http://www.thenation.com/article/l 61978/alec-exposed.
14. See Going Public: How Initial Public Offerings Work, YAHOO! FINANCE,
http://finance.yahoo.com/education/stocks/article/1 0101 9/GoingPublicHowInitia
1 Public Offerings Work (last visited Mar. 1, 2012).
[Vol. 48354
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no such thing, no business reason (compelling or not) to seek
financing from the public market. Thus, publicly traded prison
corporations exist because there is a strong market for prison stock.
More clearly stated, there is a strong market for the product that the
prison firm supplies.
There is no question that investment demand for incarceration
exists, and around 2007 that demand evolved to include immigration
detention.' 5 Detention is what we call being incarcerated, or held, for
the crime of entering the United States illegally.16 Detention is the
purgatory of the undocumented immigrant, or as is commonly known
to the American masses, the illegal alien. Detention is a new source of
income for investors, albeit a risky one, and there is a reason for this.
Publicly traded corporations are pressured to demonstrate growth in
income or earnings quarter after quarter, and including an immigration
play is a source of such growth.' 7 This is not to suggest a shift in
corporate policy, but an expansion in growth strategies. When a
corporation depends on one client for its cash flow, and therefore its
profits or earnings, the financial success of that corporation as
measured by Wall Street analysts and the market is wholly determined
by its client's policies.18 In the case of the private prison corporation,
that client is the U.S. federal or state government.' 9 There are many
private, non-publicly traded companies that service or operate prisons
through intergovernmental service agreements.20 My focus, however,
is on publicly traded corporations because of the greater transparency
of information. Public corporations are required to file disclosure
documents with the Securities Exchange Commission (the SEC) on a
15. For an example, see Texans Demand Wells Fargo Stop Investing in
Detention Camps, NAT'L PRISON DIVESTMENT CAMPAIGN (Feb. 27, 2012),
https://prisondivestment.wordpress.com/2012/02/27/wells-fargo-actions-in-texas/.
16. See Detention, FREE DICTIONARY, http://legal-dictionary.the
freedictionary.com/detention (last visited Mar. 1, 2012).
17. See Going Public: How Initial Public Offerings Work, supra note 14.
18. See, e.g., Seven Things that Determine the Value of a Business, Bus. DEV.
SOLUTIONS, http://www.bizacquisition.com/Valueofa Business.html (last visited
Mar. 29, 2012).
19. See The Perverse Incentives of Private Prisons, THE ECONOMIST (Aug. 24,
2010), www.economist.com/blogs/democracyinamerica/2010/08/privateprisons.
20. See CORR. CORP. OF AM., http://www.cca.com/ (last visited Mar. 30,
2012).
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quarterly and annual basis, or whenever the company experiences a
material change. Private companies are not regulated this way, and
therefore have no disclosure requirements. Their contracts and
business activities are generally private.
An example of such information transparency is the Corrections
Corporation of America's (CCA) annual reports. CCA is the largest
publicly traded prison corporation in the United States. In its 2011
annual report, CCA noted that its revenues heavily depend on
contracts with federal agencies, including U.S. Immigration and
Customs Enforcement (ICE):
We currently derive, and expect to continue to derive, a significant
portion of our revenues from a limited number of governmental
agencies. The loss of, or a significant decrease in, business from the
BOP, ICE, USMS, or various state agencies could seriously harm
our financial condition and results of operations. The three primary
federal governmental agencies with correctional and detention
responsibilities, the BOP, ICE, and USMS, accounted for 43% of
our total revenues for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2011
($749.3 million).... Although the revenue generated from each of
these agencies is derived from numerous management contracts, the
loss of one or more of such contracts could have a material adverse
impact in our financial condition and results of operations. We
expect to continue to depend upon the federal agencies and a
relatively small group of other governmental customers for a
significant percentage of our revenues.21
CCA, which is headquartered in Tennessee, is one of the two
dominant players in the prison industry. The Geo Group (GEO), the
other dominant player and also publicly traded corporation, is
headquartered in Florida. CCA, formerly known as Prison Realty
Trust, issued its first initial public offering (IPO) in July 1997. Known
by its ticker symbol CXW, CCA was the first to dive into third-party
corrections, ironically in the area of immigration detention. While the
firm has been generally profitable, it has also experienced many
setbacks related to experiments with structure, management, and
strategy to competitively position the company. GEO, formerly
Wackenhutt Corrections, issued its IPO in July 1994. Both companies
21. Corr. Corp. of Am., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 28 (Feb. 27, 2012).
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employed the real estate investment trust structure (REIT), separating
the management and operation of prisons from the ownership and
management of the real estate. The REIT structure was popular in the
late 1990s because it allowed real estate companies to capitalize off of
tax treatment that effectively reduced corporate income tax exposure
when eighty percent of earnings were distributed to shareholders.
Eventually, this business structure proved limiting in the quest for
growth, and both companies restructured into non-REIT C-Corps.
The private prison industry is unique and continues to evolve.
Most tout prison stock as highly attractive; however, the reality is that
the sector goes through regular growing pains. I believe this has
largely to do with the limited source of income. All contracts are
government contracts. However, prison stock is somewhat
opportunistic as the source of its profit evolves.22 The corporation that
is best positioned will capitalize off of the constant change.
The current source of profit for prisons, and the source of growth
for the criminal justice system, is the war on drugs. 23 The rate of
22. CCA's historical stock prices, for example, are characterized by constant
and regular stock splits. Stock splits allow managers of a corporation to manipulate
stock price. When the price of stock gets too high, and the margin of growth
decreases, the managers will recommend a stock split. For example, on September
13, 2006 CCA did a 3 for 2, which decreased its stock price from $67.89 per share
closing price to $44.33 per share closing on the following day. See Dividends and
Stock Splits, CORRECTIONS CORP. OF AM., http://ir.correctionscorp.com/phoenix.
zhtml?c=117983&p=irol-dividends (last visited Mar. 6, 2012); Stock Quote and
Chart, CORRECTIONS CORP. OF AM., http://ir.correctionscorp.com/phoenix.zhtml?c
=1 17983&p=irol-stockquote (last visited Mar. 6, 2012). Stock priced at $44 per
share will reflect greater growth than stock priced at $67 and close to a ceiling.
Similarly, corporations engage in reverse stock splits to manipulate a low stock price
into a higher one. CCA engaged in a reverse stock split early on in its history.
Manipulations of stock price allow managers to better align what they believe is the
intrinsic value of a corporation with the extrinsic value reflected in the stock price.
See generally Reverse Stock Splits, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMM'N (Nov. 3, 2000),
http://www.sec.gov/answers/reversesplit.htm.
23. Professors Jerry Reiman and Paul Leighton invite their readers to look at
the criminal justice system as if it were aimed at keeping a large population in courts
and prisons consisting of primarily poor people, rather than as a system protecting
citizens from crime. JERRY REIMAN & PAUL LEIGHTON, THE RICH GET RICHER AND
THE POOR GET PRISON: IDEOLOGY, CLASS, AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE (2009).
The criminal justice system, and certainly its joint venture with the private
section via contracts with the private prison companies, has an interest in
demonizing/criminalizing a population so citizens are distracted from those
7
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incarceration of blacks and brown people as a result of drug
possession has reached its optimal state. In other words, there is no
growth potential in this area. Prison companies cannot justify building
new prisons on the basis of drug convictions. However, prison
companies can justify the building of new prisons based on a whole
new kind of prisoner: the illegal alien, and more specifically, the
"Mexican." 24
In my opinion, the company best positioned to serve the federal
agency Immigrations and Customs Enforcement (ICE) will enjoy
significant and steady growth. Thus, prison corporations have a real
interest in any and all legislation that increases the number of bodies
that go through the detention or incarceration process. Growth in the
criminal population translates into returns for shareholders. Therefore,
anti-immigration policy both at the state and federal level is the next
frontier in the incarceration of black and brown bodies. While mass
incarceration remains as the bread and butter, growth in that area is
limited. It is the detention center as prison, and not the incarceration
facility, that will be a boon to the publicly traded prison corporation. 25
committing far more serious crimes-think of unfair wages, environmental
destruction, exploitation of children and workers, unsafe working conditions, theft
of billions of retirement dollars, and on and on-than drug trafficking and
possession. We have entered a phase in American politics, legislation, and
capitalism in which the brown immigrant fits the bill.
24. Regardless of actual ethnicity, it seems that all Spanish-speaking
undocumented immigrants are Mexican. Whether I have been in Brooklyn, New
York, or Charleston, South Carolina, most identify Latino day-workers or service-
workers as Mexican, when in reality many are not Mexican but from Ecuador,
Colombia, and Peru. See Brentin Mock, Immigration Backlash: Hate Crimes
Against Latinos Flourish, S. POVERTY LAW CTR., http://www.splcenter.org/get-
informed/intelligence-report/browse-all-issues/2007/winter/immigration-backlash
(last visited Feb. 29, 2012). In the outtakes to a film I watched recently, I was caught
off guard at the unnecessary comment made by a crotchety, old woman: "God loves
all colors. Except Mexican." JuNo (Fox Searchlight Pictures 2007).
25. See Stephanie Chen, Larger Inmate Population is Boon to Private Prisons,
WALL ST. J. (Nov. 19, 2008), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1227053346577
39263.html (explaining that prison companies are preparing for a wave of new
business as the economic downturn makes it increasingly difficult for federal and
state government officials to build and operate their own jails). I believe the reason
there are not more private prison contracts is because these firms have yet to totally
prove themselves to the government. Though the government is probably ready to
hand over the system to a third party, I think it will do so gradually, as the private
managers improve or perfect their operations. That said, current American culture is
358 [Vol. 48
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According to the Global Detention Project, an interdisciplinary
research project out of Switzerland, the United States "maintains the
largest detention infrastructure in the world." 26 This comes as no
surprise because the United States has the largest prison population,
and is also one of the few countries that still imposes a death
penalty.27 In addition,
[a]side from 'criminal aliens,' those confined in U.S. immigration
detention centres include undocumented immigrants,
unaccompanied minors, and asylum seekers. These detainees are
held in a panoply of types of detention sites, including dedicated
immigrant detention centres, privately run prisons, federal
penitentiaries, state and county jails, juvenile detention centres, and
semi-secure shelters run by private charities to house
unaccompanied minors.28
However, in many states, there are no separate detention centers,
and undocumented immigrants awaiting removal or asylum are held in
prisons. During the summer after my first year of law school, I
interned with the Political Asylum & Immigration Representation
Project, a 501(c)(3) organization out of Boston, Massachusetts. I
worked with the detention center initiative, which was tasked with
visiting detainees and informing them of their legal rights. I spent the
summer going to state and federal prisons in Massachusetts.
Detainees, regardless of reason for deportation or whether they are
waiting for asylum, look like prisoners. They wear the prison one-
less outraged by the idea of building detention facilities to hold illegal "aliens" than
the idea of using taxpayer money to finance the building of prisons. Furthermore,
the Department of Homeland Security's budget is exploding.
26. United States Detention Profile, GLOBAL DET. PROJECT (Mar. 2009),
http://www.globaldetentionproject.org/de/countries/americas/united-states/
introduction.html.
27. Id.
28. Id. The Global Detention Project (GDP) is an inter-disciplinary research
endeavor that investigates the role detention plays in states' responses to global
migration, with a special focus on the policies and physical infrastructures of
detention. The project is based at the Graduate Institute's Programme for the Study
of Global Migration, and receives financial support from Zennstrom Philanthropies
and the Swiss Network for International Studies. Aims, Origin, Staff, GLOBAL DET.
PROJECT, http://www.globaldetentionproject.org/about/about-the-project.html (last
visited Feb. 20, 2010).
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piece. They sleep in prison cells with a toilet in it. They eat when told
to eat, and they socialize when told to socialize, just like criminals.
And now with the anti-immigrations statutes, most will be criminals:
the new criminal.
S.B. 1070 BREATHING WHILE BROWN & ALEC
The legislation that has created a new market for prison
companies is the Arizona anti-immigration statute S.B. 1070,29 the
Support our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act, which
was signed by Governor Brewer in April 2010.30 Similar statutes have
made their way across the United States, but only five states,
including my current state, South Carolina, have enacted such laws.31
Senator Russell Pearce, who was recalled from his Arizona Senate
seat in the November 2011 elections, 32 introduced S.B. 1070 to the
Arizona senate. However, prior to introducing the statute, Senator
Pearce shared his draft legislation with the American Legislative
Exchange Council (ALEC).33 In other words, Senator Pearce had an
29. S.B. 1070, 49th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2010).
30. S.B. 1070 does not operate alone: there is the immigration law on trespass,
S.B. 1159, 49th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2009); statute on citizenship S.B. 1309,
50th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2011); and an English-only law, S.B. 1409, 50th
Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2011). See infra note 44 for the People for the American
Way Foundation's side-by-side comparison of the above-referenced Arizona
legislation.
31. See S.B. 20, 119th Leg., Gen. Assem. (S.C. 2011). See State and Local
Initiatives, NAT'L COUNCIL OF LA RAZA, http://www.nclr.org/index.php/issues and_
programs/immigration/statelocal immigration initiatives/ (last visited Feb. 27,
2012), for list of state and local legislation based on S.B. 1070 that has been passed
or rejected, or is still under debate.
32. Lacey & Seelye, supra note 1; see also Ben Tobias, Arizona Senator
Recalled over ALEC Immigration Bill, PRWATCH.ORG (Nov. 9, 2011),
http://www.prwatch.org/news/2011/11/11120/arizona-senator-recalled-over-alec-
immigration-bill.
33. American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC) is "[a] nonpartisan
membership association for conservative state lawmakers who shared a common
belief in limited government, free markets, federalism, and individual liberty."
History, ALEC, http://www.alec.org/about-alec/history/ (last visited Feb. 29, 2012).
The organization's corporate members pay dues of $7,000 to $25,000, plus
additional $2,500 to $10,000 to be on a task force. ALEC, PRIVATE SECTOR
MEMBERSHIP (2011), available at http://alec.org.tempwebpage.com/wp-content/
360 [Vol. 48
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idea for anti-immigration policy, and he took it to ALEC to refine
before introducing it to the Arizona state Legislature. 34 ALEC
subsequently tweaked the policy, and Senator Pearce's Arizona
immigration statute became the model statute for other states.
ALEC is a 501(c)(3) nonprofit organization and in its membership
brochure describes itself in part as follows:
With nearly 2,000 members, ALEC is the nation's largest
nonpartisan, individual membership association of state legislators.
ALEC is one of America's most dynamic public-private
partnerships with nearly 300 corporate and private foundation
members. ALEC provides its public and private sector members
with a unique opportunity to work together to develop policies and
programs that effectively promote the Jeffersonian principles of
free markets, limited government, federalism, and individual
liberty. 35
In his 2008 article, Professor Volokh mentions ALEC, which he
describes as having "hazy . . . innerworkings." 36 Of private prison
firms, Volokh writes:
Their political advocacy - which is extensive - mainly takes the
forms of contributions to politicians and participation in the
American Legislative Exchange Council (a conservative
organization that drafts model legislation), though they also testify
before Congress and present arguments in the popular press. But,
while it is clear that these firms advocate privatization, it is unclear
that they advocate incarceration to any significant extent.37
In retrospect, I find great irony in Professor Volokh's mention of
ALEC, because it seemed to me that Volokh's intent in raising the
issue of ALEC was purposeful and strategic. To me, his idea was to
uploads/201 _privateSector brochure.pdf. Legislative members pay $200 dues for
two-year terms and $400 for four-year terms.
34. See Lacey & Seelye, supra note 1; Sullivan, supra note 2.
35. See ALEC, LEGISLATIVE MEMBERSHIP APPLICATION (2011), available at
http://alec.org.tempwebpage.com/wp-content/uploads/2011 legislative brochure.
pdf.
36. Volokh, supra note 4, at 1229.
37. Id. at 1226.
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not hide ALEC's relationship with the prison companies, but by
coming out with the existing relationship, Volokh at once minimized
the significance of such relationship. In essence, raising the issue of
ALEC was a means to distract by creating an appearance of
transparency:
The inner workings of ALEC are hazy, and indeed, some
commentators argue that the private prison industry expressly seeks
out channels that are 'conveniently out of public view' and 'behind
closed doors' to promote its pro-incarceration agenda. The trouble
with this view is that we can also presume that prison firms work
within ALEC on privatization issues: Prison privatization is one of
the "major issues" of the very same Criminal Justice Task Force;
the Task Force has a Subcommittee on Private Prisons and has a
model 'Housing Out-of-State Prisoners in a Private Prison Act';
and CCA is known to have talked to the Task Force on the subject.
Therefore, this, too, is "soft" evidence; we do not know that they
also work on sentencing or incarceration issues. Indeed, CCA
asserts that it has not participated in, voted on, or endorsed any
stand on model legislation for sentencing or crime policies within
ALEC. 38
In 2008, when Volokh's article was published, ALEC was indeed
a non-transparent organization. However, the organization's degree of
influence and actual conduct has been recently exposed 3 9 as the
organization at the forefront of conservative Tea Party-esque
legislation.4 0 The Center for Media and Democracy, National Public
38. Id. at 1229-30 (emphasis added). Professor Volokh indicates that both
CCA and the GEO group are members of ALEC. Volokh also indicates Sodexho
Marriot is "a major CCA stockholder" and a "prominent corporate funder . . . of
ALEC." Id. at 1229. One reason I am hesitant about Volokh's piece is the audacity
of his claims, which I read and re-read in stupor. It is as if he expects the reader to
accept his position as truth because economic modeling supports his position. In my
opinion, common sense strikes away at his economic model. All lawyers and legal
scholars know smoking guns are not necessary to convict in court, and "soft
evidence" is evidence nonetheless. Perhaps it is because, as a person of color and
one who did not grow up privileged, I know that things do happen behind closed
doors, in secret.
39. Multiple progressive or radical online news outlets have exposed the
organization, notably Beau Hodai's (founder of DBA Press) reporting and on the
mainstream side National Public Radio and The Nation. See Hodai, supra note 1.
40. Such legislation includes statutes with an anti-immigration agenda, calling
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Radio, and The Nation have been instrumental in exposing the "hazy
innerworkings" of ALEC. Together these three organizations, along
with smaller outlets, have exposed the role that corporations have in
the drafting and introduction of model legislation across the United
States as members of ALEC. Discussing ALEC, the Center for Media
and Democracy tells us, and I doubt that Volokh would disagree:
ALEC is not a lobby; it is not a front group. It is much more
powerful than that. Through ALEC, behind closed doors,
corporations hand state legislators the changes to the law they
desire that directly benefit their bottom line. Along with legislators,
corporations have membership in ALEC. Corporations sit on all
nine ALEC task forces and vote with legislators to approve
"model" bills. They have their own corporate governing board
which meets jointly with the legislative board. (ALEC says that
corporations do not vote on the board.) Corporations fund almost
all of ALEC's operations. Participating legislators, overwhelmingly
conservative Republicans, then bring those proposals home and
introduce them in statehouses across the land as their own brilliant
ideas and important public policy innovations-without disclosing
that corporations crafted and voted on the bills. ALEC boasts that it
has over 1,000 of these bills introduced by legislative members
every year, with one in every five of them enacted into law. ALEC
describes itself as a 'unique,' 'unparalleled' and 'unmatched'
organization. 41
In his July 2011 piece ALEC Exposed, John Nichols of The Nation
writes:
The details of ALEC's model bills have been available only to the
group's 2,000 legislative and 300 corporate members. But thanks to
for increased prison privatization, and quite recently, anti-woman's health
personhood statutes. ALEC has drafted model legislation most recently for anti-
immigrant measures; prison privatization; voter suppression (voter ID legislation);
and measures that attack health care, environmental regulation and workers rights.
See id.; John Nichols, ALEC Exposed, THE NATION (July 12, 2011),
http://www.thenation.com/article/161978/alec-exposed; ALEC's Firm Hold on the
Arizona Legislature, PEOPLE FOR THE AM. WAY, http://www.pfaw.org/press-
releases/201 1/1 1/alec's-firm-hold-arizona-legislature (last visited Feb. 18, 2012).
41. 'ALEC' Has Been Forced to REAR ITS UGLY HEAD at Last!, DAILEY
Kos (Apr. 22, 2012), http://www.dailykos.com/story/2012/04/22/1085541/--ALEC-
Has-Been-Forced-To-REAR-ITS-UGLY-HEAD-At-Last-.
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a leak to Aliya Rahman, an Ohio-based activist who helped
organize protests at ALEC's Spring Task Force meeting in
Cincinnati, The Nation has obtained more than 800 documents
representing decades of model legislation. Teaming up with the
Center for Media and Democracy, The Nation asked policy experts
to analyze this never-before-seen archive. 42
One of the policy groups that analyzed ALEC documentation is the
People for the American Way Foundation (PFAW), an organization
dedicated to advocacy for equal rights, freedom of speech, religious
liberty, and equal justice for all.43 PFAW issued a report in 2011, in
which it compared Arizona's immigration legislation with the ALEC
model statutes. The report also lists the affiliation that members who
introduced or sponsored the bill have with ALEC, as well as the
corporations that fund ALEC. I find the literal side-by-side
comparison of the various Arizona immigration statutes and their
ALEC model counterparts to be most compelling.44 The statutes are
virtually identical.
In his paper, Volokh asserted that the interest of prison
corporations in lobbying for greater incarceration was speculative.45
The findings and comparisons of PFAW remove any credibility from
that statement; I would even go on to say that one does not need a
study or report to conclude the same. Prison corporations most
certainly have an interest in any laws that increase incarceration.
Legislation that creates new crimes, or increases sentences for existing
crimes, has immediate impact on the bottom line of government
contracts: more criminals mean more government demand for prison
facilities. Some would go a step further to argue that it is the
42. Nichols, supra note 40.
43. ALEC IN ARIZONA: The Voice of Corporate Special Interests in the Halls
of Arizona's Legislature, PEOPLE FOR THE AM. WAY (2011),
http://www.pfaw.org/media-center/publications/alec-arizona-voice-corporate-
special-interests-halls-arizonas-legislature.
44. See id. All legislators involved with S.B. 1070 are members of ALEC.
PFAW also does a side-by-side comparison of Arizona prison legislation and its
ALEC counterpart. The 100-page report also compares Arizona statutes and ALEC
model codes, voter ID laws, anti-union legislation, campaign financing, and
privatization of public services including education, health care reform, virtual
schools, and anti-environment regulation.
45. See Volokh, supra note 4, at 1226.
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corporation's duty to have an interest in such legislation, as it is the
duty of those managing the corporation to maximize shareholder
profits.
The strategy shift, or more correctly stated, the return in strategy
to immigration detention is ironic, as CCA, the first private prison
corporation in the United States, focused its initial business model on
the same. CCA's first facility was a small detention center in Houston,
Texas.46 CCA currently owns the largest detention center in the
United States: the T. Don Hutto Residential Center, located just
outside of Austin in Taylor, Texas.4 7 From 2006 to 2009, the facility
held undocumented female immigrants and their children. 48 A
reported sexual assault at the facility, now exclusively a detention
center for undocumented females awaiting removal, has brought the
problem of sexual violence at immigration detention centers to the
forefront.49
The investment opportunity in immigration corrections is handed
to prison firms on a silver platter, or as Sarabi and Bender state, the
46. The Houston Processing Center opened in 1984. See A Quarter Century of
Service to America, CORR. CORP. OF AM., http://www.cca.com/about/cca-history/
(last visited May 4, 2012).
47. This detention facility is essentially undistinguishable from a prison. T.
Don Hutto Residential Center, DETENTION WATCH NETWORK (Nov. 5, 2008),
http://www.detentionwatchnetwork.org/tdonhutto.
48. See T. Don Hutto: Women in Detention, T. DON HUTTO,
http://tdonhutto.blogspot.com/ (last visited Mar. 4, 2012). The blog has not been
updated since August 21, 2010, when a corrections officer wrote a posting on an
arrest regarding the sexual assault of a detainee. The blog states that it is "dedicated
to providing information about Hutto and women's detention issues." Id.
49. Sexual assaults at immigration detention centers within corrections
facilities are a problem recognized by ICE, which disclosed information about a
corrections officer's assault of a woman held in detention. See Editorial, A Broken,
Dangerous System, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 4, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/
2011/12/05/opinion/a-broken-dangerous-system.html ("A recent American Civil
Liberties Union report, based on documents obtained through the Freedom of
Information Act, uncovered almost 200 accusations of sexual abuse of immigrant
detainees."); Desperate Need for Oversight as Sexual Assault is Carried Out in
Immigration Detention, RESTORE FAIRNESS, http://restorefaimess.org/tag/t-don-
hutto-detention-facility/ (last visited Mar. 5, 2012). See Blog of Rights, AM. CIVIL
LIBERTIES UNION, http://www.aclu.org/blog/tag/Prison%20Rape%20Elimination%
20Act (last visited Mar. 5, 2012) for information regarding the exclusion of
immigration detention centers in the Prison Rape Elimination Act passed in 2003.
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private prison market is a "ready made market.""o Prison companies
capitalize off of (i) government inefficiencies, both at the state and
federal levels; (ii) a corrections population that has had non-stop,
documented growth, and for which continued growth is forecasted;
(iii) a capital market receptive to prison securities; and (iv) incentives
to build, including public finance and tax incentives. And with more
and more states enacting anti-immigration statutes," the market for
profit in prisons/detention centers with the state and federal
governments as the sole client is ready-made. The problem of
corporations directly influencing criminal law and policy for their
benefit is profoundly related to a business and legal culture in which
we give the corporation more rights as "legal persons" than human
beings have as "natural persons."
LATCRIT XVI
In reflecting on what was a phenomenal three days of intellectual
thought, I found a disconnect between the agenda of the Latino and
the agenda of the Black scholar. In regards to mass incarceration, I
believe the prison scholar cannot ignore or discredit the role that
immigration plays in filling U.S. prisons. When I wrote WIBB, I did
not separately consider the Latino male prison population, and it is
important to state this decision was not a choice. Considering Latinos
in my paper made it messy, primarily because the government
statistics on Latinos is inconsistent or even absent. Some reports
separate us out. Others include us as part of the black population. The
avoidance of difference speaks volumes-the Other is the Other
regardless of blackness or brownness.52 In other words, to the Self, if
you are not white, you are black, no different. And yet we, the Other,
fight and fight and fight each other because of our differences.
While it may complicate the dialogue, I believe a discussion of
mass incarceration is incomplete, and possibly even without efficacy,
if the immigration dynamic is ignored. There is no question that
brown bodies are serving as another very real and profound source for
50. See Volokh, supra note 4.
51. E.g., H.B. 56, 2011 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ala. 2011); S.B. 20, 119th Leg., Gen.
Assem. (S.C. 2011).
52. See EDWARD SAID, ORIENTALISM (1979).
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mass incarceration, and such incarceration is legally sanctioned via
this notion of immigration reform.
I took a look at Professor Alexander's text, The New Jim Crow,
and was disappointed that the mass internment of undocumented
immigrants in the United States is not addressed. This may have been
intentional-again, because I recognize that discussion of more than
one racially oppressed group can muddy the waters-but certainly not
intentional in a hurtful or dismissive way. That said, I often wonder if
to blacks, Latinos are invisible, as blacks are to whites, such that we
do not even enter the black consciousness.
This leads me to an observation I made at the conference in San
Diego. While LatCrit-the organization, the conference, the body-
has maintained an inclusive stance, I experienced a sense of
separation, most visibly to me at the Saturday morning plenary on the
Latino/a Academy. There were no blacks on the panel, and the
discussion was not about black scholars or administrators. The
discussion was actually about us. Looking around the room, LatCrit's
black scholars were notably absent, and I was at once confused but not
confused, and perhaps disappointed. As an adult, I have studied and
know more about black history and experience than about Puerto
Rico, or the history and experience of Latinos in the United States.
Ask me to name a black feminist and more than one name rolls off my
tongue-bell hooks, Assata Shakur, and Audre Lorde. Ask me to
name a Latina or Puerto Rican feminist and I have to dig deep and
think about whom I may have read; the names do not roll off my
tongue.
While I have no statistical proof or evidence of the following, I
believe knowing more about black history and experience is common
among Latino scholars, though the reverse may not be true. I have yet
to meet a black scholar that knows more about Latino history and
experience in the U.S., or even have an equal level of knowledge to
that of his or her own people. This is not to come down on my black
colleagues, but to point out a reality-there is a perceived hierarchy of
oppression that does a disservice to us all. For blacks, mostly the black
experience matters. Hence, the light treatment if any on the impact of
immigration on mass incarceration.
I do not deny the wretched treatment of blacks in the United
States and the history of violence and subordination. As previously
stated, I know more about black history than of my own people and
17
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their historical and current oppression. But the undocumented
immigrant who sacrifices his or her life to cross the border to find
work in the United States, the "illegal alien" as the white politicians
like to say, are a lower class citizen. As compared to the illegal alien,
the African American and those of us with U.S. citizenship are
privileged. The anti-immigration climate stems from the same power
trip, prejudice, and the fear of dark skin that has empowered whites to
subordinate blacks, and originally, to subordinate the Native
American. The individual that is anti-immigrant is also anti-brown,
anti-black, anti-Asian, anti-gay, anti-woman. And in the context of
mass incarceration, the Latino condition, the immigration play
completes the narrative of oppression.
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